

OGC 75-3373

16 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Agency Action on NSSM 229

1. As requested this memorandum is to indicate the direction and approach we are following in preparing for CIA participation in the Scowcroft study called for by NSSM 229. It is also by way of a progress report.

2. The developments to date are as follows:

a. I contacted Jeanne Davis and informed her that I am the CIA representative to the Scowcroft group. She indicated that an agenda and other papers would be forthcoming from the NSC Staff at an early date. She also explained some of the NSC Staff thinking which led to the decision for the NSSM and the study it calls for. She further agreed with me that the 30 September deadline for completing the work is out of the question. She in fact was sorry that the deadline had been stated because unrealistic deadlines tend to damage credibility of the NSSM itself. Notwithstanding this, I am sure the Agency and the Scowcroft group will have to press forward with their work. A memorandum of my conversation with Mrs. Davis is at Tab A.

b. By memorandum of 5 September I asked Deputy Directors (including General Wilson and Mr. Carver) and Mr. Cary to name representatives to work with me in preparing CIA positions and CIA participation. This has been done and a group is now in being and has begun its work. At Tab B is a list of these representatives. In addition, Mr. Proctor has requested to be kept informed. Mr. Blake has indicated his desire that the CIA representatives also bring to Agency attention any instances of inadequate or incomplete CIA compliance with Executive Order 11652.

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c. A paper suggesting appropriate areas of interest, review and consideration by the CIA representatives is at Tab C. This was circulated to the Deputies also in conjunction with my request that they name representatives to assist with this study.

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




Associate General Counsel

Attachments

Distribution:

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5 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSSM 229

1. I called Jeanne Davis, Staff Secretary of the National Security Council, to advise that I am the CIA designee to the Scowcroft group created by NSSM 229. She advised that the National Security Council Staff is putting together some papers with suggestions for departmental thought and hoped to have an agenda and some action underway in the next few days. I pointed out in this connection that the NSSM, dated 19 August, had proceeded within CIA only to the point of designating me as the CIA representative and I had been away until this week. It seemed to me highly unrealistic that the executive branch could thoroughly study this matter by 30 September. She entirely agreed. She said considerable slippage was anticipated. NSC regretted that they had utilized an unrealistic deadline, since this would damage credibility, but they had done so in this case. One reason she noted why action could not be accomplished that quickly is that General Scowcroft has been away.

2. I asked what had brought on the NSSM. She indicated there were a number of factors. There had been a growing feeling within the Staff that the time had come to look into the various inconsistencies posed by the Executive order and the statutes involved. There was some question as to the relationship of ICRC to NSC which ought to be resolved. The executive branch now had some experience under the Freedom of Information Act. It might be that additional exemptions ought to be included such as an exemption to protect the confidentiality of Presidential correspondence. All of these had added up to a general feeling that the time had come to thoroughly study the whole area. She hoped we agreed. I indicated I thought there were certainly a number of objections and difficulties in the existing situation and I hoped now was at least as good a time as any other for the executive branch to address itself to these matters.

3. Mrs. Davis indicated she thought the Muskie letter of 21 August, forwarding some 24 questions concerning implementation of Executive Order 11652, presents a timely opportunity to make known the burden and costs problems.

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5 September 1974

CIA Interests Re NSSM 229

1. Perhaps the fundamental point is that we must be clear that there is a distinction between classification authority under Executive Order 11652 and the statutory responsibility of the Director to protect intelligence sources and methods. Many items of information would be subject to protection under both of these sources of authority. Information classified pursuant to an Executive order is exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. So is information which is "specifically exempt from disclosure by statute." The statute which charges the Director with responsibility for the protection of sources and methods may be a statute which specifically exempts, within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, and the Agency so regards it. But this is by no means certain. The issue has never been litigated, but almost certainly will be in one or more of the upcoming Freedom of Information lawsuits. In view of the uncertainty in this area and because the question could be decided against us by the courts, it is important that CIA and the Scowcroft group in no way disregard or minimize the need for Executive order protection of information.

2. Perhaps the second most important item for CIA and Scowcroft consideration is the matter of costs, burdens and dangers of the Freedom of Information Act. As to dangers, my thought is that the extreme provisions of the Act (tight deadlines, unrestricted right of everyone to request anything, and the "reasonably segregable portions" provision), together with the difficulties of persuading judges while protecting information, and considering the heavy volume of documents with which the Agency and the intelligence community is concerned, are such that over a period of time it will become virtually impossible for the Agency to protect information. This would mean it would be virtually impossible to perform our functions.

3. It would seem to me unlikely that executive branch actions, including the work of the Scowcroft group, are going to deflect or forestall congressional action towards a statutory classification system. It would follow that we should not accept or support existing provisions or concepts in Executive Order 11652 merely because there has been some congressional satisfaction with them. For example, what is the value to the agencies or to anyone in the quarterly reports which the agencies must submit to ICRC? Has the existence of ICRC enhanced security?

4. Also relating to the foregoing, is ICRC conceptually sound? Is it appropriate to authorize a body of representatives of the various agencies to override the decisions of any of those agencies or of any other executive branch agencies, including decisions made by agency heads, and to supervise the activities of those agencies? It seems certain that ICRC can perform this function only by developing a larger staff and by meeting more often. Is it possible and is it economically feasible to create an ICRC with a sufficiently large and sufficiently expert staff to perform duties essentially duplicative of those performed by the departments involved? The basic issue involved in our recent concern with the availability of certain CIA documents for ICRC review in the Bunnell appeal was the fact that ICRC has review and veto authority.

5. I wonder if the concept of automatic declassification and the right of any individual to have any ten-year old document reviewed for declassification, both now embodied in the Executive order, are realistic concepts as applied to an intelligence agency. Since CIA exempts from automatic declassification nearly 100 percent of its documents, should we not be entirely exempt from the automatic declassification provision?

6. Should USIB be brought into the study called for by NSSM 229 and, if so, how should it be done? Should USIB study the questions posed by the NSSM and submit USIB input via the CIA representative to the Scowcroft group? Should CIA take the lead in proposing to USIB agencies that those agencies undertake to make certain that their views are made known to the Scowcroft group through channels available to the USIB agencies?

7. The NSSM does not mention the National Security Council Directive of 17 May 1972 which implements Executive Order 11652. Notwithstanding that, I believe the Agency should examine the adequacy of that document also, since it is in effect merely an extension and expansion of the scope of the order.

8. The Agency should be alert to the fact that some weeks ago a proposal for an amendment to the Executive order was initiated essentially by the Freedom of Information Committee of the Department of Justice and ICRC which would give ICRC considerable review authority with respect to classified documents involved in FOI litigation. This proposal was opposed, largely under the leadership of CIA and Mr. Warner, in particular, and is substantially dead. But its advocates almost certainly will view the forthcoming study as the vehicle to revive and push the proposal.

9. Numerous problems and difficulties exist in various provisions of the Executive order which could and should be addressed on this occasion. The matter of so-called "derivative" classification authority is one. The language of the exemptions which permit appropriate officials to exempt from automatic declassification and which are the standards to be applied on the occasion of declassification review seems questionable at best. Should not a declassification review address itself solely to the question of whether disclosure would damage national security? Exemption (4) under the Executive order concerns information the disclosure of which would place a person in "immediate jeopardy." What kind of jeopardy is intended? Is it physical safety? Job security? Is the document to be declassified if the jeopardy is not "immediate?" We should feel free to propose revision of any features or language of the order and the NSC Directive.



Associate General Counsel

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Remarks: Bill: Attached is a memorandum from [redacted] advising you of the status of the Agency participation in the classification study called for by NSSM 229. As you will see, the problem of automatic downgrading is very much a part of the agenda. Also, as I indicated orally, intra-agency memoranda recommending action are currently covered by one of the exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. The concept of stamp- ing such documents and marking the exemption appli- cable will be put on the agenda. Also, we will put on the agenda the matter of positive approach to declassi- fication through written history. [redacted] John S. Warner			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
General Counsel			9/17/75
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